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I. INTRODUCTION
You own a dry cleaner shop.1 In the winter, it gets cold, both
for your employees and your customers. But, you have a
commercial steamer that has a lot more capacity to produce
steam than you ask of it. Maybe you can use that excess steam to
run a heater and keep everybody warm.
So, you contact a commercial heating company and explain
that you want a heating system that will run off of the excess
steam produced by your existing equipment. The owner of the
heating company, Pat, comes to your shop, takes some
measurements, does some calculations, and recommends a
heating system for you.
You sign a contract for the system Pat recommended, looking
only to see that the amount you are going to pay and the
installation dates are what were agreed upon. You don’t notice
that there is no promise about the heating system being able to
be powered by your existing equipment, because, well, Pat
seemed to know what he was doing and you are sure Pat
understood what you wanted. And anyway, you’re not a lawyer.
But when the system gets installed, it turns out it needs more
steam to work properly than your steam machine can produce.
You sue the heating company, saying there was a breach of
warranty. After all, you told Pat your requirements for the heating
system and he suggested and installed one thereafter. Pat’s
lawyers, however, point out that there was a clause in the contract
that disclaimed the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
You ask your lawyer about it and she says she will fight for you,
but Pat’s lawyers have a point. She explains if Pat had articulated
a promise to provide you with a heating system that would be
powered by your existing equipment, then Pat would have made
an “express warranty”2 and the disclaimer in the contract would
be inoperative.3 But because you said you wanted a heating
system that would be powered by your existing equipment, and
Pat just recommended a particular unit knowing you were relying
1 This hypothetical is based on Thorman v. Polytemp, Inc., 1965 WL 8338, 2 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 772, 774 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. May 11, 1965). For a discussion of the case in greater
detail, see infra notes 109–115 and accompanying text.
2 There would be an express warranty in this situation because the seller would
have made an “affirmation of fact” about the heating system, which became part of the
“basis of the bargain.” See infra note 11 for the text of U.C.C. § 2-313, which codifies the
requirements to establish an express warranty, and see infra note 13 for a discussion of
the meaning of the “basis of the bargain.”
3 This is the dictate of U.C.C. § 2-316(1), see infra text accompanying note 126.
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on his recommendation, what you got is what is called a “warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose,”4 which can be disclaimed.5
You shake your head and argue that Pat did promise to
install a system that met your needs—he heard what your needs
were, and recommended, sold, and installed such a system.
Aren’t Pat’s acts the same as a promise that the product Pat
recommended would meet your needs? Your lawyer counsels that
it might seem that way to a lay person, but in the law, there is a
difference on which warranty you get depending on who first
brings up the attribute of the good that constitutes the warranty.
And the effectiveness of a disclaimer depends on that as well.
You tell your lawyer such distinctions are ridiculous, and the law
is an ass if the outcome of your case really turns on who
mentions first “the attribute of the good that constitutes the
warranty.” You are right.
The premise of this Article is that implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose, formed in the English common
law and now codified in U.C.C. § 2-315,6 should be eliminated
from Article 2 and American common law.7 Not because the
4 There would be a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose in this situation
because the seller had “reason to know [of the] particular purpose for which the goods
[were] required,” and knew that the “buyer [was] relying on the seller’s skill or judgment
to . . . furnish suitable goods.” See infra note 6 for the text of U.C.C. § 2-315, which
codifies the requirements to establish a warranty of fitness.
5 This is the dictate of U.C.C. § 2-316(2) and (3), see infra text accompanying
notes 105–108.
6 The current version of U.C.C. § 2-315 provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless
excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the
goods shall be fit for such purpose.
U.C.C. § 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2017).
The provision has been adopted in the commercial codes of all jurisdictions that have fully
adopted the U.C.C. See infra note 77.
7 For clarification, this article is not discussing the property law version of the
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. In property law, the “warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose” derives from Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348 (1892), and applies
solely to short-term rentals of furnished residential space. The modern implied warranty
of habitability developed out of the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, but the
latter has survived alongside the warranty of habitability. The requirements of the
doctrine of constructive eviction are not generally a prerequisite for termination of the
lease if there is a breach of the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, even in states
in which such requirements must be met to permit termination as a remedy for breach of
the warranty of habitability. On the other hand, this Article focuses on the warranty of
fitness quality warranty that is generated upon a sale of goods. This Article also does not
deal with the warranty provisions of the United Nations Convention for the International
Sales of Goods (1980) (“CISG”), which are principally contained in Article 35 of the CISG.
However, the if the premise of the Article were adopted by the CISG drafters, Article
35(2)(b), dealing with goods “fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made
known to the seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract” would be deleted. In its
stead, cases that would have previously been decided under Article 35(2)(b) would instead
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warranty fails to protect important interests—it does. And not
because the plaintiffs who recover under it are not worthy—they
are. Rather, the implied warranty of fitness should be eliminated
from the Code because the factual situations which give rise to it
are more properly analyzed as express warranty claims, thus
making the warranty unnecessary.
In addition to the benefits of aligning the legal issue with its
proper theory, eliminating the warranty and analyzing fitness
cases as express warranty problems will also solve various
practical and theoretical problems that have dogged the implied
warranty of fitness for decades. These include: (1) eliminating the
differential treatment as to warranty disclaimers between
express and implied fitness warranties, as discussed above, and
installing a more equitable and pro-consumer doctrine in its
stead;8 (2) abolishing the conundrum that has bedeviled courts
and practitioners for almost a century, regarding the proper
implied warranty to be alleged and proven where the “ordinary
purpose” of a good is claimed to be the buyer’s “particular
purpose”;9 and (3) installing a proper parol evidence rule analysis
when what is currently a fitness warranty is involved.10
This Article has three major substantive parts. Part II
explains why the proper theory for fitness problems is through an
express warranty theory. Part III traces a brief history of the
fitness warranty in the King’s courts, demonstrating that even
from its inception, express warranty was the proper theory to
resolve fitness issues. In fact, the judges who decided the
inaugural case ushering in the implied warranty of fitness held
that the express warranty was the proper theory to decide the
case. Part IV explains some beneficial collateral consequences of
subjecting fitness problems to the express warranty analysis,
including resolving some persistent failings of the Code that have
long plagued courts and practitioners dealing with the fitness
warranty. Finally, an appendix is attached, with suggested edits to
the U.C.C. to bring about the changes suggested by this Article.

be adjudicated under Article 35(1), which requires a seller to deliver “goods which are of
the quantity, quality, and description required by the contract . . . . ”
8 For a further explanation and discussion of the disclaimer issue, see infra Part IV(B).
9 For a further explanation and discussion of the confusion about the proper warranty
when the ordinary purpose and particular purposes are coincident, see infra Part IV(A).
10 For a further explanation and discussion of the parol evidence rule issue, see
infra Part IV(C).
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II. WHY A “FITNESS” WARRANTY IS REALLY AN EXPRESS
WARRANTY
Perhaps the best way to explain why the express warranty
provision is the correct analytical framework for what would
currently be a warranty of fitness case, is by illustration:
Situation I: A buyer walks into a dive shop. She walks
over to the section of the store that sells watches and says to the
storeowner, “My dive watch broke and I’m looking for a
replacement.” The owner replies, “I like the Acme 200. It’s what
I use. It stays watertight down to 200 feet.” He then selects a
new Acme 200 from the display case and hands it to her. The
buyer says, “I’ve been doing some deeper diving lately, so a
watch that will be watertight down to 200 feet is just what I
need. I’ll take your recommendation.” She then purchases the
watch and takes it on her next dive.
Situation II: The same buyer walks into the same store,
and tells the same owner, “My dive watch broke and I am looking
for a replacement. I’ve been doing some deeper diving lately, so I
need a watch that will stay watertight down to 200 feet. What do
you recommend?” The owner says, “I like the Acme 200. It’s what
I use,” and selects a new Acme 200 from the display case and
hands it to the buyer. She responds, “I’ll take your
recommendation.” She then buys the watch and takes it on her
next dive.
Traditional warranty law would say that an express
warranty is created in Situation I, because there is an
“affirmation of fact” by the seller which “relates to the goods” and
which “becomes part of the basis of the [sales] bargain.”11 On the

U.C.C. § 2-313 provides:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to
the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to
the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use
formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific
intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the
goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or
commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
U.C.C. § 2-313.
11
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other hand, warranty law would say that an implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose is created in Situation II, because “the
seller at the time of contracting ha[d] reason to know” of the
“particular purpose for which the [watch was] required” and because
“the buyer . . . rel[ied] on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or
furnish suitable goods.”12 This analytical distinction is nonsense.
Legally, the two situations produce the same contract. In
both situations, the law should (and does) protect the buyer’s
legitimate expectation of acquiring a watch that will stay
watertight down to 200 feet and has a claim against the seller if
it does not. As such, the two situations should be analyzed
identically, and, as explained below, the express warranty theory
is the proper framework for such analysis.
The only factual difference between the two situations is
that the seller in Situation I initially mentions the warranted
attribute of the good, whereas the buyer mentions the warranted
attribute of the good in Situation II. However, in both situations,
at the time of sale, it can be fairly said that: (1) the seller has
promised the buyer that the watch will be watertight down to
200 feet; and (2) the buyer was relying on that promise in
deciding to purchase the watch.13 As such, both situations should
be analyzed and interpreted the same way, namely by protecting

Id. § 2-315.
Of course, there is some disagreement whether the buyer must show reliance in
order to recover for an express warranty due to a disagreement over the meaning of the
term “basis of the bargain” in the statute. While many courts view the term as a synonym
for reliance, see, for example, Royal Bus. Machs., Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 44
n.7 (7th Cir. 1980) (“The requirement that a statement be part of the basis of the bargain in
order to constitute an express warranty ‘is essentially a reliance requirement . . . .’” (quoting
Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760, 766 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff’d, 568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978))),
others believe it means only that the affirmation regarding the attribute of the good need
only be said during the bargaining process. See, e.g., Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Laird, 432
So. 2d 1259, 1261 (Ala. 1983) (stating that a showing of reliance is not necessary to give
rise to express warranties); see also Daughtrey v. Ashe, 413 S.E.2d 336, 338 (Va. 1992)
(“In our opinion, the ‘part of the basis of the bargain’ language of Code § 8.2–313(1)(b)
does not establish a buyer's reliance requirement. Instead, this language makes a seller's
description of the goods that is not his mere opinion a representation that defines his
obligation.”). There are even some who believe it shifts the burden to the seller to prove
there was no reliance. See, e.g., Hauter v. Zogarts, 534 P.2d 377, 383–84 (Cal. 1975). See
generally Steven Z. Hodaszy, Express Warranties Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Is
There a Reliance Requirement?, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 468, 475–84 (1991); J. David Prince,
Defective Products and Product Warranty Claims in Minnesota, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1677, 1687–90 (2005). The point here, however, is not to argue for the correctness of any
one of these views, but rather to establish that the analysis of the contracts arising from
Situation I and Situation II should be the same in this regard. At most, a buyer in any
jurisdiction would have to establish reliance, which is shown in both Situations I and II.
In addition, if a jurisdiction would not require reliance on the part of the buyer to form an
express warranty in Situation I, it should not require a greater showing to find an
enforceable promise of water tightness in Situation II.
12
13
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in the same manner the expressed attribute of the good that is an
important part of the parties’ bargain.
One of the problems in how the law currently approaches
fitness cases is that it labels the warranty involved as an
“implied” warranty. Analytically, it makes sense to call the
implied warranty of merchantability, set forth in U.C.C. § 2-314,
an “implied” warranty,14 for what is implied in establishing the
merchantability warranty is the warranty itself. That is, no party
has to promise or request during the bargaining process that the
good will be “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods
are used,”15 or be “of fair [and] average quality within the
description,”16 or “pass without objection in the trade under the
contract description”17—which are some of the statutory definitions
of merchantability. The parties do not need to utter such terms
because, unless disclaimed, those terms are implied-in-law and
become part of the contract with a merchant seller sub silentio.
On the other hand, with a fitness warranty, the warranted
attribute of the good—that the watch is waterproof down to 200
feet in Situation II above—is expressly stated, albeit initially by
the buyer. What is implied is the seller’s adoption or ratification
of the attribute specified by the buyer, i.e., that the seller
willingly “stands behind” or vouches for the attribute. However,
under any view of normative bargaining, such adoption is fairly
attributed to the seller by his or her actions and words. Indeed,
the entire warranty of fitness is dependent upon the act of the

U.C.C. § 2-314 provides:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant
with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food
or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
(f) conform to the promise or affirmations of fact made on the container or
label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties may
arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
U.C.C. § 2-314.
15 Id. § 2-314(2)(c).
16 Id. § 2-314(2)(b).
17 Id. § 2-314(2)(a).
14
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seller in providing a good that meets the buyer’s “particular
[expressed] purpose.” Therefore, in contractual terms, the
“implied” part of the implied warranty of fitness arises from an
implied-in-fact contract, or one which “arises from mutual
agreement and intent to promise, when the agreement and
promise have simply not been expressed in words.”18 Although it
may initially seem that identifying a fitness warranty as an
implied-in-fact contract may argue against analyzing it as an
express warranty, just the opposite is true. This is because,
analytically, the law treats implied-in-fact contracts identically
with express contracts.19 Further, the notion that an act can have
a communicative quality is well established in the law; for
example, in waiver and hearsay cases.20 Thus, no “analytical
stretch” is necessary to look at fitness situations through the
express warranty lens. In fact, the law, and the history of the
warranty itself, command it. It is to the latter we turn next.
III. HOW DID WE GET HERE? A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FITNESS
WARRANTY
An appropriate place to start tracing the history of the
fitness warranty is the beginning of the nineteenth century,
during the time of the Industrial Revolution.21 English common
law of contract had incorporated the concept of consideration for
about a century,22 and contract claims were being brought in

1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1:5 (4th ed. 2007).
Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 256 P.2d 947, 959 (Cal. 1953) (“The only distinction
between an implied-in-fact contract and an express contract is that, in the former, the
promise is not expressed in words but is implied from the promisor's conduct. . . . Under
the theory of a contract implied in fact, the required proof is essentially the same as under
the first count upon express contract, with the exception that conduct from which the
promise may be implied must be proved.”).
20 See e.g., United States v. Abou-Saada, 785 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1986) (“We agree . . . that
[Defendants’] pointing amounts to hearsay, for it is conduct intended as an assertion.”); People
v. Zollbrecht, 548 N.Y.S.2d 380, 384 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1989) (“The Court . . . finds that
Mr. Sannicandro's statements made by way of a deliberate blinking of his eyes at a time when
he was incapable of verbally communicating are admissible.”); Marles v. State, 919 S.W.2d
669, 671 (Tex. App. 1996) (“Many nonverbal actions of a defendant at the time of arrest
are relevant and admissible.”); 13 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:28
(4th ed. 1990) (stating that intention to waive nonperformance of a condition under the
Restatement Second of Contracts § 84 may be inferred from the waiving party’s actions).
21 BRUCE MAZLISH, THE FOURTH DISCONTINUITY: THE CO-EVOLUTION OF HUMANS
AND MACHINES 64 (1993) (“All of these developments were rooted, if one can use that
organic term, in the swelling movement toward mechanization characteristic of the
Industrial Revolution. Of course, that revolution drew upon earlier developments, both
technical and conceptual. Only the degree and sweep of what happened in the Western
world in the period from around 1760 to 1850 justifies the use of the term revolution.”).
22 8 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 7 (1925) (“[T]he leading
characteristics of consideration . . . emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries . . . .”).
18
19
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assumpsit.23 Express warranties were well recognized,24 and
mostly in the form we have today.25
At the turn of the nineteenth century, caveat emptor was still
a guiding mercantile principle,26 and because of it, the courts
held there was no need for any implied warranty—whether
merchantability or fitness.27 That is, if the bread was moldy or
the cloth too sheer for making a coat, the law assumed buyers
would have noticed these defects during the bargaining process,
and if they did not, well, that was their “tough luck.” However, as
commercial opportunities increased during the Industrial
Revolution, English sellers progressively stopped being
peripatetic, for they did not have to travel to foreign countries to
purchase goods and bring them back to England, a la Marco
Polo.28 Instead, they ordered goods from foreign suppliers
without first seeing them, or having seen only a sample.29 Rather
than telling the English buyers that it was their “tough luck” for
dealing with a sharp-practicing foreign seller who shipped
inferior goods, the English courts instead instituted an implied
warranty of merchantability in 1815, establishing a minimum

23 Id. at 6 (“[I]t was during the latter half of the sixteenth century that assumpsit
became alternative to debt. . . . By the end of the century, therefore, it had become
definitely the chief contractual action of the common law.”).
24 See, e.g., James B. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1888)
(referencing a 1383 case held to be “perhaps, the earliest reported case upon a
warranty”); Denison v. Ralphson (1682) 86 Eng. Rep. 235, 235; 1 Ventris, 365, 365
(stating that the Defendant was “to deliver to him ten pots of good and merchandizable
[sic] pot-ashes, and that not regarding his promise, and to defraud him, he delivered him
ten pots of ashes not merchandizable [sic], but mixed with dirt”).
25 See, e.g., Walker v. Milner (1866) 176 Eng. Rep. 773, 775 n.a; 4 F. & F. (“The best
definition that can be given of a warranty—that it is a representation made part of the
contract—appears to imply that it is a representation of some certain and existing—past
or present—matter of fact; known or capable of being known; as that the article is the
work of a certain maker or manufacturer . . . .”).
26 See, e.g., Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 Y ALE
L.J. 1133, 1186 (1931) (“Not until the nineteenth century, did judges discover that caveat
emptor sharpened wits, taught self-reliance, made a man—an economic man—out of the
buyer, and served well its two masters, business and justice.”)
27 See, e.g., Parkinson v. Lee (1802) 102 Eng. Rep. 389, 391; 2 East 314, 320–21 (“No
implied warranty can be raised from a fair price in the sale of hops any more than in the
sale of a horse, where it is admitted that it does not exist. . . . If then an implied warranty
be to be raised in this, it must in all other cases of sale; and then the maxim of caveat
emptor will become an exception instead of a general rule.”).
28 See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES 204 (E.M. Morgan
ed., 1930) (In “a community whose trade is only one step removed from barter . . . [t]wo vital
presuppositions reign: first, that the goods in question are there to be seen; second, either
that everybody knows everybody’s goods, individually, in a face-to-face, closed,
stable group . . . .”).
29 Id. at 204 (“Overseas trade in seaports introduces . . . dealing in goods at a distance,
before they can be seen. Markets widen with improved transportation . . . [and] [t]his means
reliance on distant sellers.”).
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quality for commercially traded goods.30 An example of this is
shown in Gardiner v. Gray, a case dealing with the sale of twelve
bags of “waste silk,” where Lord Ellenborough opined:
Where there is no opportunity to inspect the commodity, the maxim of
caveat emptor does not apply. He cannot without a[n] [express]
warranty insist that it shall be of any particular quality or fineness,
but the intention of both parties must be taken to be, that it shall be
saleable in the market under the demonination [sic] mentioned in the
contract between them.31

Another example is in Laing v. Fidgeon, a case dealing with a horse’s
saddle, where Chief Justice Gibbs stated, “[T]he [seller] . . . ought to
furnish a merchantable article.”32
The first mention of a fitness warranty in the King’s Courts
came ten years later in an opinion by Chief Justice Charles
Abbott (Lord Tenterden), who was both the trial judge and one of
the appellate judges in Gray v. Cox. In his capacity as appellate
judge, Chief Justice Abbott said:
At the trial it occurred to me, that [when] a person sold a commodity for
a particular purpose, he must be understood to warrant it reasonably fit
and proper for such purpose. I am still strongly inclined to adhere to
that opinion, but some of my learned brothers think differently.33

His reasoning did not attract the concurrence of the other
judges, but the term a buyer’s “particular purpose,” and the
suggestion that a warranty arises when a seller affirms that the
goods sold are “fit” for that purpose under it, had made their
appearances in the common law.34 However, even taking Chief
Justice Abbott’s words at face value, a new implied warranty of
fitness was neither needed, nor called for. It would be equally
plausible to say that if a seller communicated, directly or
30 Calvin W. Corman, Implied Sales Warranty of Fitness for Particular Purpose, 1958
WIS. L. REV. 219, 219–21 (1958).
31 (1815) 171 Eng. Rep. 46, 47; 4 Camp. 144, 145.
32 (1815) 128 Eng. Rep. 974, 974; 6 Taunt. 109, 109.
33 (1825) 107 Eng. Rep. 999, 1002; 4 B. & C. 107, 115.
34 The short summary of the influence of the Industrial Revolution on the gestation
and birth of the two implied warranties given above is certainly the traditional view, and
is an accurate one if only the decisions in the King’s Courts are examined. See generally
Ames, supra note 24, at 8–10. I am working on an article tracing warranty’s history in
greater detail, and the full story is a bit more nuanced. There are references to cases
decided on what we would now call “warranty of merchantability” and “warranty of
fitness” theories hundreds of years earlier in alternative, arbitral fora applying the
principles of the Law Merchant. See, e.g., 1 SELECT CASES CONCERNING THE LAW MERCHANT,
A.D. 1270–1638 91 (Charles Gross ed. & trans., Selden Soc’y No. 23, 1908); 2 SELECT CASES ON
THE LAW MERCHANT, A.D. 1239–1633 28–30 (Hubert Hall ed. & trans., Selden Soc’y No. 46,
1930); 2 BOROUGH CUSTOMS 182 (Mary Bateson ed. & trans., Selden Soc’y No. 21, 1906).
These fora included the courts of piepowder and staple, as well as other arbitral
“courts.” See generally Charles Gross, The Court of Piepowder, 20 Q.J. E CON. 231
(1906); Hamilton, supra note 26, at 1133.
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indirectly, through words or actions, that a good she35 sold would
satisfy a “particular purpose” of the buyer, a warranty based on
the express promise arising from those words and actions would
be established upon the conclusion of the bargain.
The first case ushering in the warranty of fitness as part of
the common law’s permanent consumer protection arsenal was
decided four years later in Jones v. Bright.36 Jones serves as an
example of hard cases make bad law.37 The case is hard because
of its unusual facts, which are unlikely to be repeated.
Regardless, as will be shown below, the common interpretation of
the case—that it ushered in a new implied warranty38—was
incorrect from its inception. In fact, the judges who decided Jones
thought it was an express warranty case, and the facts certainly
fit an express warranty theory.
In Jones, the Plaintiff-buyer, Jones, owned a ship called the
Isabella.39 The Defendant-seller, Bright, owned a business that
manufactured and sold copper plates.40 The Plaintiff wanted to
purchase the Defendant’s copper plates to sheath the underside
of the Isabella.41 Copper under-cladding for a ship usually lasted
four to five years.42
If the facts of the case were “typical” for a fitness case, the
Plaintiff would have gone to Defendant’s shop and had some
conversation with the seller about the attributes and suitability
of the copper plates for the Isabella. The analysis would then be
whether the discussion of those attributes constituted a
warranty. However, that did not happen. Instead, the following is
what we are told:
Fisher, a mutual acquaintance of the parties, introduced them to each
other, saying to the Defendants, “Mr. Jones is in want of copper for
35 Single women were traders in England from at least the fourteenth century. 1
BOROUGH CUSTOMS 227 (Mary Bateson ed. & trans., Selden Soc’y No. 18, 1904).
36 Jones v. Bright (1829) 130 Eng. Rep. 1167. There can be little doubt that Jones
was decided as part of the emerging English consumer protection law. Lord Chief Justice
Best, one of the judges who decided Jones, said:
It is the duty of the Court, in administering the law, to lay down rules calculated
to prevent fraud; to protect persons who are necessarily ignorant of the qualities
of a commodity they purchase; and to make it the interest of manufacturers and
those who sell, to furnish the best article that can be supplied.
Id. at 1171.
37 See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 659 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Just as
‘bad facts make bad law,’ so too odd facts make odd law.”); Winterbottom v. Wright (1842) 152
Eng. Rep. 402, 406 (“Hard cases, it has been frequently observed, are apt to introduce bad law.”).
38 See, e.g., Corman, supra note 30, at 220; Emlin McClain, Implied Warranties in
Sales, 7 HARV. L. REV. 213, 218 (1893–1894); Jones, 130 Eng. Rep. at 1168.
39 Jones, 130 Eng. Rep. at 1168.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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sheathing a vessel, and I have pleasure in recommending him to you,
knowing you will sell him a good article;” one of the Defendants
answered, “Your friend may depend on it, we will supply him well.”43

It is unclear whether this exchange moderated by Fisher was by
letter or in person. On the one hand, it reads as if the
introduction and response was by letter, as it is unlikely a
defendant would say, “Your friend may depend on it,” if Jones
was standing right there.44 However, one judge later suggested
that this was “a loose conversation at the time of the sale.”45 In
any event, this communication constituted the entire reported
pre-sale discussion between the parties, and it is thus possible no
promise whatsoever was directly communicated between the
parties, and was only exchanged through Fisher.46
However, either because Jones was part of the “we will
supply him well” conversation, or was told about it later, he must
have relied on that promise because he thereafter sent his
shipwright47 to the Defendant’s warehouse. The shipwright
rummaged through “sheets of various size, thickness, and
weight”48 at the facility, and selected several sheets of copper
that were purchased by the Plaintiff at “market price as for
copper of the best quality.”49 While it is unlikely there was no

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
45 Id. at 1171 (opinion of Best, C.J.) (emphasis added).
46 Id. at 1172 (opinion of Best, C.J.). Sometime after the sale, Defendant sent
Plaintiff an invoice which read simply, “Copper for the ship ‘Isabella,’” along with the
price for the sheathing. Id. at 1168. By today’s commercial standards, we would expect the
invoice to be generated at the time of sale, and thus be a potential source of warranty, but
apparently that was not the tradition between merchants in England in the late 1800’s.
As stated by Chief Justice Best, “An invoice, however, is frequently not sent till long after
the contract is completed . . . .” Id. at 1171 (opinion of Best, C.J.). Only Chief Justice Best
dealt with the issue of the invoice stating a warranty, and even he concluded that the
promise, “We will supply him well,” was ultimately the warranty on which the verdict
should be upheld:
[I]f we look at the invoice alone, we see in the present case that the copper was
expressly for the ship “Isabella.” However, I do not narrow my judgment to
that, but think on the authority of a case not cited at the bar, Kain v. Old (2 B.
& C. 634), that “where the whole matter passes in parol, all that passes may
sometimes be taken together as forming parcel of the contract, though not
always, because matter talked of at the commencement of a bargain may be
excluded by the language used at its termination.” . . . Here, when Fisher, a
mutual acquaintance of the parties, introduced them to each other, he said,
“Mr. Jones is in want of copper for sheathing a vessel;” and one of the
Defendants answered, “We will supply him well.” As there was no subsequent
communication, that . . . amounted to a warranty.
Id. at 1171–72.
47 A shipwright is a “[m]an skilled in the building and repairing of ships.” C.W.T. LAYTON,
DICTIONARY OF NAUTICAL WORDS AND TERMS 341 (Brown, Son & Ferguson LTD, 2d ed. 1967).
48 Jones, 130 Eng. Rep. at 1168.
49 Id.
43
44
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conversation while the shipwright was rummaging through the
various plates at Defendant’s factory, there is, again, no record of it.
The plates selected by the shipwright were put on the
Isabella, and the vessel set sail for Sierra Leone. The copper
failed on this first voyage, lasting but four months instead of the
expected four to five years.50 There was a dispute between the
parties as to what caused the premature breakdown of the copper.
Plaintiff’s expert testified the reason was that the copper “might
have imbibed more oxygen than it ought to contain” during its
manufacture.51 On the other hand, Defendant claimed the failure
was caused “from the singular inveteracy of the barnacles in the
river at Sierra Leone, where the ship lay for some time.”52
The trial judge left it to the jury “to determine whether the
decay in the copper was occasioned by intrinsic defect or external
accident; and if it arose from intrinsic defect, whether such defect
were [sic] occasioned in the process of manufacture.”53
The jury found that “the decay [in the copper] was occasioned
by some intrinsic defect in the quality of the copper; but that
there was no satisfactory evidence to shew [sic] what was the
cause of that defect.”54 Verdict was therefore entered for the
Plaintiff, with damages to be ascertained later by a specially
appointed arbitrator.55 Hence, while the jury found that the
copper was not up to snuff, it did not specifically find a breach of
any warranty. As a result, the jury obviously did not identify
what that warranty was¾that was left to be sorted out by the
four appellate judges who heard the case.
The judges were unanimous in holding the Defendant liable
because he did not provide copper suitable for sheathing ships
regardless of defect or accident.56 There were statements by each
judge that could be read as resting the decision on a new implied
fitness warranty. For example, Chief Justice Best explained that
the fitness warranty was a natural extension of the implied
warranty of merchantability:

Id.
Id.
Id. In addition, the Defendant also asserted a caveat emptor/contributory negligence
defense, claiming that, “the quality of copper might always be known by its appearance and
malleability;” so that “if there had been any defect in [the copper] sold to the Plaintiff, his
shipwright must have discovered it while in the act of sheathing the vessel.” Id. The jury
apparently rejected this argument, as it found for the Plaintiff. Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1173–74.
50
51
52
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If a man sells an article, he thereby warrants that it is
merchantable,—that it is fit for some purpose. This was established in
Laing v. Fidgeon. If he sells it for a particular purpose, he thereby warrants
it fit for that purpose; and no case has decided otherwise. . . . Whether or
not an article has been sold for a particular purpose, is, indeed, a
question of fact; but if sold for such purpose, the sale is an
undertaking that it is fit.57

A second judge, Sir James Park, opined that the fitness warranty
had already been established in Chief Justice Abbott’s (Lord
Tenterden’s) opinion mentioned above, Gray v. Cox, and that
Jones was controlled by it:
[I]s there not, where the purchaser cannot judge of the interior of the
article, and buys for a particular purpose, an implied warranty, that
the article is fit and proper for the purpose for which it is
purchased? . . . The principal object of attack has been the case of
Gray v. Cox, where Lord Tenterden said, “that if a person sold a
commodity for a particular purpose, he must be understood to warrant
it reasonably fit and proper for such purpose.” And this is not to be
esteemed an obiter dictum, because the other judges differ from him.
It is his judgment formally given, and goes to support the argument
for the Plaintiff . . . .58

Lord Burrough, a third judge in the case, explained his reasoning
for upholding the verdict as follows:
The Defendants knew what the copper was wanted for, and made
it; . . . The copper, instead of lasting four or five years, lasted only one
voyage, and this was proved to have been occasioned by a defect in the
manufacture. I cannot comprehend why the action should not lie.59

And finally, the fourth appellate judge who heard the case, Judge
Gaselee, wrote:
The case has been so fully gone into, that I shall make only one or two
observations. . . . [I]t is clear that where goods are ordered for a
particular purpose, the law implies a warranty that they are fit for that
purpose. . . . How far the case might have been altered if the Defendants
has not manufactured the copper, I do not say; but as to the warranty,
the declaration could scarcely have been, other than it is.60

The premise of this Article is that any implied fitness case is
really an express warranty case, and such is true here, despite
the language above suggesting an implied fitness warranty. None
of the quoted language above is inconsistent with there being an
express warranty implied from the acts and words of the seller.
That is, if the focus was on a warranty arising from an expression

57
58
59
60

Id. at 1172 (opinion of Best, C.J.).
Id. at 1173 (opinion of Park, J.).
Id. at 1174 (opinion of Burrough, J.).
Id. at 1174 (opinion of Gaselee, J.).
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of Defendant’s needs as communicated by Fisher: “Mr. Jones is in
want of copper for sheathing a vessel;”61 then the case could be
read as imposing on the Defendant an implied warranty that the
copper would meet Jones’s needs when he thereafter sold
Plaintiff the copper. However, if the focus is instead on the
Defendant’s promise, “We will supply him well,”62 and the act of
selling Jones the copper, then the case is more properly
understood as a breach of warranty to supply suitable copper for
cladding a ship expressly undertaken by the Defendant, since the
copper did not “supply” Jones “well.” Hence, looking at it from the
point of view of the Defendant creating the express warranty,
what is “implied” is an express suitability warranty stemming
from the words and actions of the Defendant in providing the
copper after hearing of its intended use. It is the express promise
(or rather the express warranty) of the Defendant under this
view that serves as the basis of the claim. As noted above,
analysis under such a theory is entirely consistent with the
language from the judges quoted above.
If we were to leave the case there, an argument could be
made for interpreting it as either resting on an implied fitness
warranty basis or an express warranty basis. However, three of
the four judges themselves held that the theory on which the case
was affirmed was breach of express warranty, derived from the
“we will supply him well” promise, and the fourth said it did not
matter whether the warranty was viewed as an express or an
implied one. Chief Justice Best opined:
Here, when Fisher, a mutual acquaintance of the parties, introduced
them to each other, he said, “Mr. Jones is in want of copper for
sheathing a vessel;” and one of the Defendants answered, “We will
supply him well.” As there was no subsequent communication, that
constituted a contract, and amounted to a warranty. . . . Here there
has been, in my opinion, an express warranty.63

Judge Burrough similarly stated:
[A]fter Fisher had introduced the parties, and stated the purpose for
which the Plaintiff wanted the copper, the Defendants warranted the
article by undertaking to serve the Plaintiff well. . . . I put it on the
ground of an express warranty and the finding of the jury that the
copper was insufficient, and am of opinion that the verdict for the
Plaintiff must stand.64

61
62
63
64

Id. at 1172 (opinion of Best, C.J.).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1173–74 (opinion of Burrough, J.) (emphasis added).
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Sir James Park stated, “the evidence of Fisher . . . goes to
shew [sic] an express warranty . . . .”65 Finally, Judge Gaselee
stated, “Without enquiring whether the warranty here be express
or implied, it is clear that where goods are ordered for a
particular purpose, the law implies a warranty that they are fit
for that purpose.”66
As such, read in its entirety, Jones should not be understood
as, or used as precedent for, establishing a new implied warranty
of fitness. Rather, the case should more properly be read to hold
that when a defendant undertakes to supply a good that meets
the specifications asked for by the buyer, by words and actions,
those words and actions, by implication, constitute an affirmative
promise that the goods will meet the specification. Thus, the case
is more properly understood as an express warranty case, where
the suitability of the copper for cladding the ship flowed from,
and was, an implied-in-fact promise of the Defendant based on
his sale of the copper to Jones after hearing of its intended use,
and based on his promise to serve Jones “well.” As such, Jones is
fundamentally the same case, and presents the same issues, as
Situation II above.
Even though the provenance for ushering in an entirely
new warranty was thin in Jones, the case was cited throughout
the remainder of the nineteenth century as establishing the
fitness warranty.67 The warranty was thus reasonably wellentrenched in the common law when Sir Mackenzie Chalmers
followed the codification urgings of Jeremy Bentham68 and

Id. at 1173 (opinion of Park, J.) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1174 (opinion of Gaselee, J.) (emphasis added).
67 See, e.g., Brown v. Edgington (1841) 133 Eng. Rep. 751, 756 (opinion of
Bosanquet, J.); 2 Man. & G. 279, 291 (“In Jones v. Bright, . . . the court was of opinion,
that the defendants being informed of the purpose for which the sheathing was wanted,
an implied warranty arose.”); Chanter v. Hopkins (1838) 150 Eng. Rep. 1484, 1487
(opinion of Parke, B.); 4 M. & W. 399, 406 (“Now I agree with the authority which Mr.
Byles has referred to, of Jones v. Bright, that if an order is given for an undescribed and
unascertained thing, stated to be for a particular purpose, which the manufacturer
supplies, he cannot sue for the price, unless it does answer the purpose for which it was
supplied.”); Jones v. Just (1868) 3 QB 197 at 202–03 (Eng.) (“[W]here a manufacturer or
dealer contracts to supply an article which he manufactures or produces, or in which he
deals, to be applied to a particular purpose, so that the buyer necessarily trusts to the
judgment or skill of the manufacturer or dealer, there is in that case an implied term or
warranty that it shall be reasonably fit for the purpose to which it is to be applied. In such
a case the buyer trusts to the manufacturer or dealer, and relies upon his judgment and
not upon his own.”) (citations omitted).
68 Robert D. Brain & Daniel J. Broderick, The Derivative Relevance of Demonstrative
Evidence: Charting its Proper Evidentiary Status, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957, 989–90 (1992)
(noting that Jeremy Bentham, a nineteenth century English utilitarian philosopher, wrote a
treatise, which was “arguably the most influential among scholars,” in which he attempted
to structure and codify English law and urged others to do so).
65
66
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authored the British Sales Act of 1893.69 Section 14(1) of that
Act provided:
Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the
seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, so as to
show that the buyer relies on the seller’s skill or judgment, and the
goods are of a description which it is in the course of the seller’s
business to supply (whether he be the manufacturer or not), there is
an implied condition that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such
purpose, provided that in the case of a contract for the sale of a
specified article under its patent or other trade name, there is no
implied condition as to its fitness for any particular purpose.70

It is interesting that the British Sales Act expanded upon,
and changed, the holding of Jones a bit. Under the Act: (1) the
fitness warranty was limited to merchant sellers; (2) a specific
reliance requirement was added before a plaintiff could be
successful; and (3) the warranty was described as a condition,
and not a term.71
The implied warranty of fitness set forth in section fourteen
of the British Sales of Goods Act was itself rewritten some by
Professor Williston when he presented his “Draft of An Act
Relating to the Sale of Goods” in 1903,72 as he eliminated the
merchant limitation and described the effect of meeting the
criteria as establishing a warranty term, not a condition, in
section fifteen of the Act:

69 Chalmers first drafted the bill in 1888 and the draft was submitted to Parliament for
comment; a revised draft was submitted in 1889 and referred to the Standing Committee on
Law. M.D. Chalmers, The Codification of the Law of Sale, 12 J. INST. BANKERS 11, 14 (1891).
Between Chalmers' initial draft and the final form of the UK Sale of Goods Act
1893, there were changes in the language of the section concerned with fitness
for purpose and merchantable quality that subtly altered meaning. One of
these shifts concerns communication of a particular purpose. The initial draft
required the buyer, relying on the seller's skill and judgment, to order goods for
a particular purpose known to the seller. The April 1893 Bill required the
buyer expressly or impliedly to make known to the seller the particular
purpose so as to show the buyer relies on the seller. . . . It should also be noted
that the side note that said caveat emptor was dropped.
Gail Pearson, Reading Suitability against Fitness for Purpose—The Evolution of a
Rule, 32 SYDNEY L. REV. 311, 321–22 (2010). See also Corman, supra note 30, at 224.
(identifying Chalmers as the drafter of section fourteen).
70 Sale of Goods Act 1893, c. 71, § 14(1) (Eng.).
71 Other parts of section fourteen of the British Act, such as the “patent or trade
name” exception, were put in different subsections in the American Sales of Goods Act.
The idea behind this exception was that, if a buyer asked for a product with a particular
trade name, e.g., a Ford F-150 Truck, a buyer could not bring a fitness claim if the truck
lacked the towing capacity the buyer also mentioned he or she was looking for, since the
buyer had, in essence, selected the product. See Corman, supra note 30, at 224–26.
72 SAMUEL WILLISTON, DRAFT OF AN ACT RELATING TO THE SALE OF GOODS § 15(1) (1903)
(codified as amended at U.C.C. § 2-315 (1951)); see Corman, supra note 30, at 224 (identifying
Professor Williston as the author of the Uniform Sales Act section fifteen).
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Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the
seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it
appears that the buyer relies on the seller’s skill or judgment
(whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied
warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose.73

The next major statutory adaptation of the warranty in the
United States was in the original 1952 draft of the U.C.C., and
that version remained unchanged in the 1972 version of the
U.C.C.74 The U.C.C. drafters kept the Willistonian ideas of
having the section be applied as a warranty term (as opposed to a
condition), and rejecting the idea that the warranty be limited to
only merchant-sellers. In addition, the U.C.C. changed two
requirements of section fifteen. First, the requirement of the
buyer having to make “known to the seller the particular purpose
for which the goods are required,” was eliminated and replaced
with a requirement that the seller “has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required” from any
source, not just from the buyer.75 The second change eliminated
the requirement that, “it appear[] that the buyer relies on the seller’s
skill or judgment,” and replaced it with a requirement that the buyer
actually “rely[] on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods.”76 The statutory warranty of fitness has largely been
WILLISTON, supra note 72, § 15(1) (emphasis added).
The 1952 version of § 2-315 Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose
states the following:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless
excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the
goods shall be fit for such purpose.
U.C.C. § 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1952).
For comparison, see the 1972 version of § 2-315 Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular
Purpose, which states the following:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless
excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the
goods shall be fit for such purpose.
U.C.C. § 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1972).
75 Id.
76 Id. The U.C.C. also modified the “patent or trade name” exception rule. See Corman,
supra note 30, at 241. It removed it from the text, and added the following Comment:
The elimination of the "patent or other trade name" exception constitutes the
major extension of the warranty of fitness which has been made by the cases
and continued in this Article. Under the present section the existence of a
patent or other trade name and the designation of the article by that name, or
indeed in any other definite manner, is only one of the facts to be considered on
the question of whether the buyer actually relied on the seller, but it is not of
itself decisive of the issue. If the buyer himself is insisting on a particular
brand he is not relying on the seller's skill and judgment and so no warranty
results. But the mere fact that the article purchased has a particular patent or
73
74
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left unchanged since then, and has been adopted without change by
every jurisdiction that has fully adopted the U.C.C.77
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF ANALYZING “FITNESS” PROBLEMS UNDER
AN EXPRESS WARRANTY THEORY
In addition to the jurisprudential benefit of using the proper
theory to evaluate a “fitness” case, eliminating the implied
warranty of fitness provision and analyzing fitness cases under
the express warranty theory would create three other collateral
benefits: (A) it would eliminate the problem of trying to decide
the proper implied warranty claim where the plaintiff’s
particular purpose is the good’s general purpose; (B) the fitness
warranty would appropriately be harder to disclaim; and (C) a
more accurate application of the parol evidence rule to fitness
situations would result.

trade name is not sufficient to indicate non-reliance if the article has been
recommended by the seller as adequate for the buyer's purposes.
U.C.C. § 2-315, cmt. n.5 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 1952).
77 Alabama: ALA. CODE § 7-2-315 (LexisNexis 2019); Alaska: ALASKA STAT.
§ 45.02.315 (2019); Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-2315 (2019); Arkansas: ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-2-315 (West 2019); California: CAL. COM. CODE § 2315 (Deering 2019); Colorado:
COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-315 (2019); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-2-315 (2019);
Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-315 (2019); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.315
(LexisNexis 2019); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 11-2-315 (2019); Guam: 13, GUAM CODE
ANN. § 2315 (2019); Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 490:2-315 (LexisNexis 2019); Idaho:
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-2-315 (West 2019); Illinois: 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-315
(West 2019); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-2-315 (West 2019); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 554.2315 (West 2019); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN § 84-2-315 (West 2019); Kentucky: KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.2-315 (West 2019); Louisiana: LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 (2019);
Maine: ME. STAT. tit. 11, § 2-315 (2019); Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 2-315
(West 2019); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-315 (2019); Michigan: MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.2315 (West 2019); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.2-315
(West 2019); Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-315 (West 2019); Missouri: MO. ANN.
STAT. § 400.2-315 (West 2019); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-315 (West 2019);
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-315 (West 2019); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 104.2315 (LexisNexis 2019); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:2-315
(LexisNexis 2019); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-315 (West 2019); New Mexico:
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-315 (LexisNexis 2019); New York: N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 2-315
(Consol. 2019); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2-315 (West 2019); North
Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 41-02-32 (West 2019); Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1302.28 (LexisNexis 2019); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-315 (West 2019);
Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72.3150 (West 2019); Pennsylvania: 13 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2315 (West 2019); Rhode Island: 6A R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-315
(2019); South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-315 (2019); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 57A-2-315 (2019); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-315 (2019); Texas: TEX.
BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.315 (West 2019); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-315
(LexisNexis 2019); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-315 (West 2019); Virginia: VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.2-315 (2019); Virgin Islands: V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 11A, § 2-315 (2019);
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2.315 (LexisNexis 2019); West Virginia: W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 46-2-315 (LexisNexis 2019); Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 402.315 (West
2019); Wyoming: WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34.1-2-315 (2019).
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A. Eliminating the Implied Warranty of Fitness Would Eliminate
the Problems Associated with Deciding Which Implied Warranty
Should Control When the “Ordinary Purpose” of the Good is
Coincident with the Buyer’s “Particular Purpose” for the Good
Having fitness cases resolved under an express warranty
theory will provide the benefit of eliminating a persistent implied
warranty issue, namely, which implied warranty is violated
when a buyer’s “particular” purpose is the “ordinary” purpose for
which the good is used.78 This is an issue because the implied
warranty of merchantability is violated when goods are not “fit for
the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used,”79 while, of
course, the implied fitness warranty is violated when the goods
are not fit for the “particular purpose” of the buyer. To illustrate,
suppose a buyer goes into a Home Depot and asks for a barbecue
that will allow her “to safely and deliciously barbecue steaks.”
Assume the Home Depot representative recommends a particular
model, and the customer buys it based on that recommendation.
However, the purchased barbeque never gets hot enough to cook a
steak properly because of some hard-to-discover manufacturing
defect that put a clog in the gas line, which eventually causes the unit
to explode. The unit did not fulfill the buyer’s particular purpose¾it
did not allow the buyer to “safely and deliciously cook steak”¾but
surely the ordinary purpose of any barbecue sold at Home Depot
is to cook meats, like steaks, both safely and deliciously. So which
warranty was violated by the defective grill¾the warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose, the warranty of merchantability,
or both?
Many courts have answered that when the buyer’s particular
purpose and the good’s ordinary purpose coincide, they merge
together to form some sort of “fitability” warranty, and a plaintiff
can recover under either theory. For example, in Great Dane
Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Malvern Pulpwood, Inc., the buyer
purchased “pulpwood trailers” in order to transport pulpwood,

78 See generally U.C.C. § 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON
UNIF. STATE LAWS 1972). To be clear, the situation I am describing is different from the
situation in which a buyer conveys a non-ordinary, particular purpose to the seller, the
seller furnishes what purports to be a suitable good, but the good turns out to be so
shoddy that not only does it fail to serve the buyer’s particular purpose, but it is also
unmerchantable. In that case, both implied warranties are violated, as contemplated by
the U.C.C.’s drafters, “[a] contract may of course include both a warranty of
merchantability and one of fitness for a particular purpose.” Rather, the situation I am
speaking about above is that recurring subset of cases where the “particular purpose” of
the buyer is the “ordinary purpose” of the goods. See U.C.C. § 2-315, cmt. n.2 (AM. LAW
INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2017).
79 U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 1972) (emphasis added).
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which was also the ordinary purpose of the trailers.80 The trailers
did not work very well and the buyer brought suit, claiming a
breach of both the warranty of merchantability and of fitness.81
At trial, however, the buyer only pursued the fitness claim, and
the only jury instructions provided were on a fitness theory.82
The seller claimed merchantability was the proper theory
because it was not aware of any “particular purpose” for the
trailers, and since no verdict was entered on that theory, the
verdict in Plaintiff’s favor should be reversed.83 The court stated:
Great Dane contends that it was aware only of the ordinary purpose to
which the pulpwood trailers would be used—hauling pulpwood—and
was unaware of any other purpose. Great Dane . . . states that before
it can be liable for a breach of the warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose, it must be shown it, as a supplier, knew that a particular
purpose was intended by the consumer, Malvern Pulpwood. Instead,
Great Dane asserts only the ordinary purpose for which the trailers
would be used was shown, giving rise to a warranty of
merchantability—a warranty which was not incorporated in the
instructions given the jury. Great Dane’s argument overlooks the fact
that, under the circumstances of the case, the particular purpose
involved was pulpwood hauling. If the particular purpose for which
goods are to be used coincides with their general functional use, the
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose merges with the
implied warranty of merchantability.84

The idea of a merger of the two warranties is clever and has
been used frequently by courts for nearly a century in these types
of cases.85 However, the U.C.C. drafters instructed that

785 S.W.2d 13, 14, 17 (Ark. 1990).
Id. at 14.
82 Id. at 17.
83 Id.
84 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). For lists of other cases where courts have
merged fitness and merchantability concepts, see 1 JAMES J. WHITE, ROBERT S.
SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 10.36 929 n.1 (6th ed.
2012), 1 DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, OWEN & DAVIS ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4:22
272 n.7 (4th ed. 2014), and 3 DAVID FRISCH, LAWRENCE'S ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314:139 376 nn.10–11 (3d ed. 2013).
85 Professor Corman, in his article on the implied warranty of fitness, observed that
appellate courts have upheld “ordinary purpose” claims on fitness grounds since the 1920s:
The parallel growth of this implied warranty and of industry is typified by the
automobile. At the beginning of the twentieth century the motor vehicle had
scarcely left the inventor's workshops; by 1929, there were almost thirty-two
million cars and trucks in use throughout the world. During the period of
initial growth of the automobile industry, courts in England and the Unites
States were liberal in finding both particular purpose and reliance in the
purchaser's favor. Purchases for the purpose of use as a "pleasure car" or "for
touring purposes," or "to convey the purchaser from place to place," are little
more than application of the common or general purpose, and yet were found to
justify reliance as purchases for a particular purpose. Similar decisions are to
be noted in the related areas of trucks and farm tractors.
80
81
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merchantability and fitness are separate and distinct theories.
They have stated in the infamous Comment 2 to 2-315:
A “particular purpose” differs from the ordinary purpose for which the
goods are used in that it envisages a specific use by the buyer which is
peculiar to the nature of his business whereas the ordinary purposes
for which goods are used are those envisaged in the concept of
merchantability and go to uses which are customarily made of the
goods in question. For example, shoes are generally used for the
purpose of walking upon ordinary ground, but a seller may know that
a particular pair was selected to be used for climbing mountains.86

Comment 2 may provide more shade than light when trying
to adapt it to any particular case; nevertheless, it is fairly read as
stating that the two implied warranties are separate because
they have different purposes.87 That, also, is the prevailing view
of leading commercial law commentators. For example, White,
Summers, and Hillman say:
Those unfamiliar with the differences between the warranty of
merchantability (fitness for the ordinary purposes for which such
goods are used) and the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
often confuse the two; one can find many opinions in which the judges
used the terms “merchantability” and “fitness for a particular
purpose” interchangeably. Such confusion under the Code is
inexcusable. Sections 2-314 and 2-315 make plain that the warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose is narrower, more specific, and more
precise. . . . [However], [a]n increasing number of courts have held
that the 2-315 warranty as to fitness for a particular purpose may
arise when the buyer’s “specific use” is the same as the “general use”
to which the goods under contract are usually put. We are wary of
such cases. They apparently enlarge the scope of the 2-315 warranty
beyond the intent of the drafters.88

Corman, supra note 30, at 222–23 (footnotes omitted). The “fitability” merger theory is
also present in cases like Minneapolis Steel & Mach. Co. v. Casey Land Agency, 201 N.W.
172 (N.D. 1924). There, the buyer purchased a tractor for use on his farm, saying he
needed it, among other things, for plowing. Id. at 173. The tractor did not meet the
Plaintiff’s needs, and the court had the following to say with regard to situations in which
the particular purpose and ordinary purposes are coincident:
The “particular purpose” for which the tractor was purchased was for use in
connection with general farm work, discing, plowing, etc. A “particular
purpose” is not some purpose necessarily distinct from a general purpose. A
particular purpose is, in fact, the purpose expressly or impliedly communicated to
the seller, for which the buyer buys the goods; and it may appear from the very
description of the article, as, for example, “coatings,” or a “hot water bottle.”
Id. at 175.
86 U.C.C. § 2-315 cmt. n.2 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON
UNIF. STATE LAWS 1952).
87 Id.
88 WHITE, SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 84, at 928–30 n.1 (citations omitted).
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The authors of a leading products liability treatise agree:
More fundamentally . . . the fitness warranty is entirely distinct and
independent from the implied warranty of merchantability. As lucidly
explained in comment 2 to § 2-315, above, this distinction is so
perfectly clear that one might reasonably conclude that an “ordinary”
use by definition must be separate and distinct from a purpose that is
“particular” to a buyer. . . . Notwithstanding the logic of this view, some
courts remain confused. Perhaps led astray by comment 2 to § 2-315, a
few courts have ruled that an ordinary use under § 2-314 can also
amount to a particular purpose under § 2-315.89

Another commercial treatise echoes this idea:
The warranties of merchantability and of fitness for a particular
purpose are distinct. . . . A court must not confuse the implied
warranty of merchantability and the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose. However, courts have done so. The fitness of goods
for their ordinary use is covered by the implied warranty of
merchantability as contrasted with the non-normal use that
constitutes a particular purpose.90

If fitness and merchantability are thus left as is, courts are
left with two unappealing choices in these types of cases: (1) they
can fashion a merged “fitability” warranty to ensure deserving
plaintiffs will recover, but in doing so, ignore the dictates of the
U.C.C.’s drafters; or (2) put the plaintiff (and his or her lawyer) to
the task of selecting the “correct” (or at least “correct” in the
court’s view) theory, with the possibility that recovery will be
denied if the wrong choice is made. Choosing the “correct” theory
is not just a matter of pleading¾it is also a matter of proof.
Going to trial under a fitness theory requires putting on evidence
that the seller “ha[d] reason to know” of the buyer’s
requirements, and actual reliance by the buyer “on the seller’s
skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods.”91 On the
other hand, successfully trying a merchantability case requires
proof of what the “fair average quality” is of the good delivered,
or what are the “ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used,” or what characteristics of the good would allow it to “pass
without objection in the trade” in order to prevail.92

OWEN & DAVIS, supra note 84, at 271–72 (footnotes omitted).
FRISCH, supra note 84, at 376 (footnotes omitted). See also BARKLEY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER
SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES § 6:4 (2017) (“[T]he courts in many cases treat
the two implied warranties as tweedledum and tweedledee, so that the same set of facts
can lead to a breach of both.”).
91 See U.C.C. § 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 2017).
92 See Id. § 2-314(2). Of course, a successful plaintiff on a merchantability theory
could also prevail upon establishing one of the other listed tests for merchantability in
U.C.C. § 314(2), such as the good not being “adequately contained, packaged, and
89
90
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The potential pitfalls in the difference in proof between the
two implied warranties was illustrated in Schenck v. Pelkey.93
There, the Plaintiff used the swimming pool slide manufactured
by Defendants and suffered quadriplegic injuries after sliding
down headfirst.94
The trial court held for the Defendants.95 On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut noted the following confusion by
the trial court:
The [trial] court construed the plaintiffs’ complaint, which alleged an
implied warranty “that said slide would be reasonably fit for the purpose for
which it was purchased,” to be a complaint invoking . . . the section of the
Uniform Commercial Code that describes an implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose.96

In other words, although the Plaintiff alleged a breach of the
warranty of merchantability (claiming the slide was not “fit for
the ordinary purpose for which” such goods are used under
U.C.C. § 2-314), the trial court interpreted the complaint as suing
for breach of a warranty of fitness.97 The court, therefore,
instructed the jury that the Plaintiff had to show that the
manufacturer knew of the particular purpose for which the
Plaintiff wanted the slide, and relied on some sort of advertised
purpose by the Defendants promising to fulfill that purpose to
prevail.98 Since the Plaintiff’s lawyer made no such showing, the
jury was left with “virtually no choice other than to find for the
defendants on implied warranty.”99 However, “[t]he plaintiffs
claim[ed] that they were entitled to a charge based on the
implied warranty of merchantability . . . proof of which requires
neither specific representations nor reliance.”100
The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, pointing out the
confusion of the trial court, and holding that the Plaintiff was
entitled to a merchantability instruction, since “[t]he purpose for
which this slide was purchased was obviously the ordinary
purpose.”101 Hence, while the reviewing court eventually set
things right, the trial court and the parties were needlessly put
to the task of determining which warranty was violated,
labeled.” Id. But the point still remains that the proof required to establish a
merchantability claim is different from that needed to prevail under a fitness theory.
93 405 A.2d 665 (Conn. 1978).
94 Id. at 667–68.
95 Id. at 668.
96 Id. at 670 (footnote omitted).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 670–71 (footnote omitted).
101 Id. at 671.
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resulting in a mistaken, outcome-determinative choice by the
court, all due to the confusing analysis when a particular and
ordinary purpose become conflated. There are other such cases in
which the deserving plaintiff was not so fortunate.102
If U.C.C. § 2-315 were eliminated, this confusion would go
away. If, by words and actions, an express warranty that a good
has certain attributes is created, then suit can, and should, be
brought on an express warranty theory, regardless of whether
the attribute is the ordinary purpose for which the good was sold.
There would be no penalty to the plaintiff for also bringing an
implied merchantability claim in addition to an express warranty
one, since, where reasonable, “[w]arranties whether express or
implied shall be construed as consistent with each other and as
cumulative” under U.C.C. § 2-317.103 More importantly, however,
there would also be no penalty to the plaintiff for not bringing a
merchantability claim in that situation, since the two warranties
would act independently, even if they might sometimes cover the
same transaction.104

102 See Beth Schiffer Fine Photographic Arts, Inc. v. Colex Imaging Inc., No. 10-cv-5321
(WHW), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65338 *1, *31–35 (D.N.J. May 13, 2014), as another example
of the perils facing a plaintiff trying to choose the correct implied warranty theory because
of the differences in proof between fitness and merchantability. There, the Plaintiff-buyer
provided a variety of services to commercial and professional photographers, including
making photographic prints. Id. at *1, *34. The Plaintiff purchased a printer, seeking a
“professional grade machine.” Id. at *2. However, the printer did not work, and the Plaintiff
brought suit claiming a breach of both fitness and merchantability warranties. Id. at *3–5.
The court noted that “[i]f there is only one purpose asserted, a plaintiff may not assert
claims under both implied warranties,” and that “[t]he particular purpose warranty ‘is not
triggered when the buyer communicates to the seller that the buyer intends to use
the goods for their ordinary purpose.’” Id. at *31–32 (quoting Ferrari v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., No. A-1532-07T2, 2009 N.J. Super. LEXIS 346 (Jan. 30, 2009)).
Determining that “processing and printing photographic prints for professional operators
is ‘the general purpose for which [the machines are] manufactured and sold,’” the court
found that there was not a breach of an implied warranty of fitness. Id. at *34–35 (citation
omitted). The court acknowledged, however, had the Plaintiff “shown that [the] Defendant
knew it intended to use its machine in a setting so susceptible to vibrations,” it may have
prevailed on a fitness theory; but since that had not been made clear to the seller, a fitness
claim could not be sustained. Id. at *35. The court also held that the Plaintiff had not
proven a breach of the merchantability warranty as “Plaintiff ha[d] failed to create a
genuine issue of material fact that the [machine] was not reasonably fit for its ordinary
purpose,” since “[t]he record supports only a finding that the machine did not function in the
circumstances in which Plaintiff attempted to use it.” Id. As such, the verdict for the Defendant
was upheld, due to the Plaintiff’s confusion on what had to be proven. Id. at *31–36.
103 See U.C.C. § 2-317 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 2017); see also id. § 2-315, cmt. n.2 (“A contract may of course include both a
warranty of merchantability and one of fitness for a particular purpose.”).
104 See Corman, supra note 30, for a situation in which the two implied warranties
might justifiably coexist in the same transaction.
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B. Eliminating the Implied Fitness Warranty Would Change
the Rule as to Disclaiming What are Now Fitness Warranties
(and Rightly So)
Another beneficial consequence of eliminating U.C.C. § 2-315
is that warranty disclaimers for what is now the fitness warranty
would be more appropriately analyzed and applied.
Under the U.C.C. as it currently stands, two subsections
govern the disclaimer of a fitness warranty. The first is U.C.C.
§ 2-316(2), which provides that to disclaim an implied warranty of
fitness, “the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous.”105
The Code does not require the use of any particular word to
disclaim the warranty¾not even the words “warranty” or
“fitness.”106 However, the Code provides exemplar disclaimer
language in § 2-316(2), stating that “[l]anguage to exclude all
implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example,
that ‘There are no warranties which extend beyond the description
on the face hereof.’”107
The following subsection, U.C.C. § 2-316(3), provides instruction
for how to disclaim both implied warranties¾merchantability and
fitness¾at the same time. It provides that, “all implied warranties
are excluded by expressions like ‘as is,’ ‘with all faults,’ or other
language which in common understanding calls the buyer’s attention
to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no
implied warranty.”108
The case on which the opening to this Article was loosely
based, Thorman v. Polytemp, Inc., illustrates the relative ease
with which a fitness warranty can be disclaimed.109 There, the
buyer, a dry cleaner, purchased a steam heating unit for its
premises.110 It discussed its needs and desires with the
Defendant, telling the Defendant that it wanted to get the steam
to run the new heating unit from its existing dry-cleaning
equipment.111 As the court explained:
U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
See generally U.C.C. This is in contrast to a disclaimer of the implied warranty of
merchantability, where the drafters have mandated use of the word “merchantability” for
any valid disclaimer. Id. § 2-316(2).
107 Id. One cannot be faulted for doubting that if the “average Joe” who reads “[t]here
are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof” on a purchase
and sale document would immediately come to the conclusion that no warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose would apply to the transaction. Id. If nothing else changes as a
result of this Article, hopefully a U.C.C. drafter will agree that some editing of the
exemplar fitness disclaimer is warranted.
108 Id. § 2-316(3)(a).
109 1965 WL 8338, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 772, 774 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. May 11, 1965).
110 Id. at 773.
111 Id. at 773–74.
105
106
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Plaintiff contends that the contract was for the installation of the
space heating unit for operation in the existing steam system in
conjunction with the dry cleaning and pressing equipment which was
being and was to be supplied from the same boiler; that, having
surveyed the existing steam system and having ascertained the
boiler’s rated BTU per hour output capacity and the requirements of
the equipment it was then serving, defendant impliedly warranted
that the heater unit it recommended was fit for plaintiff’s particular
purposes as disclosed to defendant’s engineer; [and] that it knew that
plaintiff relied on defendant’s skill and judgment in the selection and
furnishing of a suitable space heating unit to be operable within the
existing steam generating system.112

However, the written contract between the parties had the
following disclaimer: “The warranties and guarantees herein set
forth are made by us and accepted by you in lieu of all statutory
or implied warranties or guaranties [sic], other than title.”113
There was no promise in the written contract concerning the
steam from the dry cleaning equipment being sufficient to power
the heating unit.114
In finding for the Defendant, the court determined that:
But for the disclaimer provisions of the contract, the facts here
established would have sustained a finding that such an implied
warranty rose in this case, and that the warranty had been
breached. . . . These provisions negate plaintiff’s claim of an implied
warranty of fitness for a particular or intended use or purpose, and
bar his recovery, for he cannot be given the benefit of a warranty
which he has expressly waived.115

While a seller can thus relatively easily disclaim fitness
warranties, express warranties are much harder to disclaim
under the Code. The U.C.C. drafters made it clear that when a
seller tries to negate or limit an express warranty, any such
incompatible words of “negation or limitation [of the express
warranty] [are] inoperative.”116
Express warranties are difficult to disclaim because a
consumer is more likely to be aware of the warranty as opposed
to the disclaimer.117 By definition, an express warranty term
Id. at 773.
Id. at 774.
Id.
115 Id.
116 U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 2017).
117 See Michael J. Phillips, Unconscionability and Article 2 Implied Warranty
Disclaimers, 62 CHI. KENT L. REV. 199, 242–43 (1985) (“It seems safe to assume that
sellers are not in the habit of pointing out implied warranty disclaimers to consumers.
And it is difficult to believe that consumers actually read such disclaimers at or before the
time of the sale. In fact, the realities of much consumer merchandising suggest that, as
112
113
114
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must be a “basis of the bargain” for the warranty to apply, and
any attempt to dangle an enticing term in front of a buyer,
causing him or her to buy the product, and then whisking it away
by some sort of written disclaimer on the receipt or in the
contract, is abhorrent and not tolerated.118 Indeed, a seller who
knows he or she is not going to stand behind a material,
“dickered” attribute promised during contract negotiation may
have committed fraud, and has demolished an important pillar
on which the foundation of the bargain rests.119
Carpetland U.S.A. v. Payne 120 is an example of how the Code
deals with disclaimers in an express warranty context. There,
Payne was shopping for carpet at the Defendant’s store, and was
assisted by a sales representative named Lewis.121 As the court
recounted, Payne testified, “I just asked [Lewis], uh, how long—was
there a warranty with it, and he said a year. If anything went
wrong, they would replace it . . . .”122 The carpet unraveled a few
weeks after it was installed but Carpetland refused to replace it,
relying on the warranty disclaimer found on the reverse side of
the sales contract: “EXCEPT FOR DESCRIPTION ON
REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, BUYER ACKNOWLEDGES THAT
NO EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES (INCLUDING
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS) HAVE
BEEN MADE BY SELLER AND SELLER HEREBY DISCLAIMS
ALL SUCH WARRANTIES. THERE ARE NO WARRANTIES

compared with other form terms, disclaimers have less chance of being read.” (footnotes
omitted)); Disclaimers of Warranty in Consumer Sales, 77 HARV. L. REV. 318, 330 (1963)
(“Some jurisdictions go so far as to require that a seller ‘fairly procure’ his disclaimer by
bringing it to the actual notice of the buyer.” (emphasis added)).
118 U.C.C. § 2-313.
119 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (Am. Law Inst. 1981); see
also, e.g., Kurt M. Saunders, Can You Ever Disclaim an Express Warranty?, 9 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 59, 62 (2015) (citation omitted) (“To allow a seller to disclaim an
express warranty that the seller freely promised would appear to be illogical. As the
comment to section 2-313 states: ‘Express warranties rest on “dickered” aspects of the
individual bargain, and go so clearly to the essence of that bargain that words of
disclaimer in a form are repugnant to the basic dickered terms.’”); accord JOHN EDWARD
MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 101 (5th ed. 2011) (“It would, for example, be
ludicrous to honor a clause generally disclaiming all express warranties. If given literal
effect, such a clause would effectively disclaim even the express warranty arising from a
description of the goods.”); Vincent A. Wellman, Essay: The Unfortunate Quest for Magic
in Contract Drafting, 52 WAYNE L. REV. 1101, 1109 (2006) (“A moment's reflection
confirms that the very idea of disclaiming all express warranties is not only self-defeating,
but would be ludicrous in effect. . . . If there were truly no warranties, then a contract to
sell a car could be fully satisfied by delivery of a skateboard . . . because the complete
absence of warranty would mean that there would be no basis on which to assert that
delivery of a skateboard . . . did not satisfy the contract’s terms.”).
120 536 N.E.2d 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
121 Id. at 307.
122 Id. at 308.
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WHICH EXTEND BEYOND THE FACE HEREOF.”123 The court
was little impressed with Carpetland’s supposed disclaimer, and
relying on the version of U.C.C. § 2-316(1) in the Indiana
Commercial Code and prior case law, the court stated:
If an express warranty and a disclaimer of an express warranty exist
in the same sale, an irreconcilable conflict emerges. If it is
unreasonable or impossible to construe the language of an express
warranty and the language of a disclaimer as consistent, the
disclaimer becomes inoperative. In the present case Lewis’s assertion
that the carpet was guaranteed for one year and the disclaimer which
purported to negate all express warranties were clearly
inconsistent. . . . Therefore, the disclaimer is deemed inoperative and
its existence cannot stand as a bar to Payne’s recovery.124

Surely, if Payne could enforce the carpet replacement
guarantee even in light of a disclaimer, the buyer in Situation II
above should be able to enforce the representation that the watch
would stay watertight down to 200 feet in the presence of a
disclaimer as well. The law cannot allow the seller of the watch
to dangle the down-to-200-feet dickered term in front of the buyer
and then take it away by means of a few printed words on a sales
receipt, like in Carpetland U.S.A., especially when it would not
countenance such a tactic in Situation I. The buyer in both
Situations I and II relied on the articulated promise of the
watertight attribute of the watch and would be much more
conscious of the warranty promise than any disclaimer slipped
into the sales contract. The best way to stop the possibility of
having a disclaimer trump a fitness warranty is to treat the
warranty for what it is¾an express warranty¾and to use U.C.C.
§ 2-316(1)’s direction that words of negation and limitation are
inoperable to defeat any express warranty.
C. Eliminating the Implied Fitness Warranty Would Allow for a
More Equitable Application of the Parol Evidence Rule
As explained above, analyzing disclaimers of what is now a
warranty of fitness using the “words-of-negation” approach of
U.C.C. § 2-316(1) is both fairer and consistent with normative
bargaining.125 However, that approach is subject to one potentially
significant limitation¾the parol evidence rule. U.C.C. § 2-316(1)
provides, in its entirety:
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and
words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be

Id. at 309.
Id. (citations omitted).
125 See U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 2017).
123
124
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construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but
subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence
(Section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that
such construction is unreasonable.126

That is, when an express warranty and a disclaimer eliminating
that warranty are both in evidence, the inoperative clause of
U.C.C. § 2-316(1) directs that the disclaimer be disregarded.
However, there is a possibility that an oral warranty made while
the deal is being negotiated will never make it into evidence
because it will be blocked by the application of the parol evidence
rule, leaving only the disclaimer as the controlling term. This is
especially more likely when the written contract has an effective
integration clause, like in the case of Silver v. Porsche of the Main
Line,127 where the court held that “the fully integrated, written
purchase order contract containing an ‘as is’ clause would bar the
introduction of parol evidence of pre-contract representations
made by the Dealer . . . [because the integration clause] both
‘cancels and supercedes’ any prior agreements . . . .”128
Because the parol evidence rule might keep an oral warranty
from the jury that was crucial to the buyer’s purchase decision, the
parol evidence clause should be eliminated from U.C.C. § 2-316(1),
as it is a terrible rule. However, its history and the way courts
have diminished its impact make for an interesting story.
The original 1951 version of § 2-316(1) had no parol evidence
clause, and simply disallowed any express warranty disclaimer
or words of limitation.129 The only mention of parol evidence was
in Comment 2 to the provision, noting that a buyer’s false
assertion of express warranty might be kept out of evidence by
virtue of the parol evidence rule.130 However, in the 1957 version
of the Code, the drafters added the parol evidence clause to
U.C.C. § 2-316(1), so as to take the idea of protecting a wrongly
accused seller with the parol evidence rule from a comment to the
text (and it is that version which persists today).131
The provision has not proven popular with the courts,
understandably, because, in most cases, rather than keeping a
Id. (emphasis added).
No. 1057, 2015 WL 7424848, at *1, *3, *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 2015).
Id. at *3–4; see also, MURRAY, JR., supra note 119, § 101 (“A statement amounting
to an express warranty will be inadmissible if the writing of the parties is so final and
complete that reasonable parties would certainly include such a statement of fact about
the goods in such a writing.”).
129 U.C.C. § 2-316 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS, Proposed Final Draft Spring 1950).
130 Id.
131 U.C.C. § 2-202 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS 1957).
126
127
128
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false assertion of warranty out of evidence, it has, in fact,
deprived a deserving plaintiff of recovery. As a leading treatise
put it, “[C]ourts are somewhat hostile toward efforts to employ
the parol evidence rule in this way, particularly in cases
involving consumers.”132 As a result, courts have come up with a
number of ways to limit the application of the parol evidence rule
in express warranty cases. These include:
1) Finding that the written contract is only partially
integrated, and thus allowing the express warranty into evidence
as a “consistent additional term.” As Professor Richards noted,
“If the buyer can persuade the court that the written agreement
is only partially integrated, parol evidence of express
warranties will be admissible as consistent additional terms”;133

132 3 FREDERICK H. MILLER & WILLIAM H. HENNING, HAWKLAND’S UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2A-214:7 (Carl S. Bjerre, database updated June 2019).
133 Janet L. Richards, As-Is Provisions¾What Do They Really Mean?, 41 ALA. L. REV.
435, 441 (1990); see e.g., Wilson v. Marquette Elecs., Inc., 630 F.2d 575, 580 (8th Cir. 1980)
(“There was no evidence that indicated the parties intended the manual or this sentence in
the manual to be a final expression of their agreement. Therefore, the parol [express]
warranties are not barred.”); Ltd. Flying Club, Inc. v. Wood, 632 F.2d 51, 57 (8th Cir. 1980)
(“The description of the airplane as set forth in the logbook [the source of the express
warranty] is . . . a consistent additional term and may be introduced to explain the actual
agreement between the parties.”); Zutz v. Case Corp., No. 02–1776 (PAM/RLE), 2006 WL
463539, at *1, *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 24, 2006) (“The Court finds that the parol evidence is
admissible in this case. The purchase order form does not contain a merger or integration
clause. . . . Thus, the substance of the alleged express warranties does not contradict the
purchase order form.”); CGBM 100, LLC v. Flowserve US, Inc., No. G-15-026, 2016 WL
7475701, at *1, *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2016) (“[T]he merger clause can offer Flowserve no
escape since it cannot be seriously contended that Plaintiffs intended the written contract to
be a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.”); Potter v. Shields,
140 N.W. 500, 501–02 (Mich. 1913) (“[T]he contract relied upon consists of a letter written
by defendants and its alleged acceptance in an oral conversation. It cannot be claimed that
the written instrument is the completed contract; and it has been repeatedly held that in
such a case parol evidence may be had to show that a warranty constituted a part of the
contract.”); A & A Discount Ctr., Inc. v. Sawyer, 219 S.E.2d 532, 535 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975) (“It is
our opinion that the printed form contract executed by the parties was not intended to
integrate and supersede all of the negotiations, representations and agreements between the
parties, and that the evidence of the representation or warranties that the pool would be
suitable for commercial use was not excluded by the parol evidence rule . . . .”);
Barrientos v. Sulit, 133 Misc. 2d 1061, 1063 (N.Y. City Ct. 1986) (“The fact that the
warranty was oral and the contract of sale was written does not invoke the parole
evidence rule to ban proof of the warranty. I find that the written agreement was not
intended as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement, and thus,
evidence of express warranty was admissible.”); Morgan Bldgs. & Spas, Inc. v. Humane
Soc’y of Se. Tex., 249 S.W.3d 480, 488 (Tex. App. 2008) (“Considering the surrounding
circumstances, we conclude the written purchase agreement was not intended to embody
the complete and exclusive terms of the agreement of the parties, and is only partially
integrated. Under the parol evidence rule, the trial court could consider evidence of
consistent additional terms to explain or supplement the terms of the written agreement.”
(citations omitted)); WHITE, SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 84, § 13:4 (“A written
agreement may be contradicted by parol evidence if it [is] not intended by the parties as a
final expression of their agreement.”); CLARK & SMITH, supra note 90, § 4:28 (noting that
some courts will not only determine that a writing is partially integrated, but also hold

Do Not Delete

194

5/22/20 8:28 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 23:1

2) Finding that the written agreement is ambiguous, and
thus the express warranty should be admitted to explain the
vague contract;134
3) Finding that the seller who makes an oral express
warranty and thereafter attempts to disclaim it, has committed
fraud, and the fraud vitiates the disclaimer;135
4) Finding that the express warranty was an expression of a
course of dealing, course of performance, or usage of trade, and
thus admissible to explain the agreement. As one court explained,
“the court admitted parol evidence to show that, under the parties’
course of performance, the language contemplated a 30-day
warranty against latent mechanical defects that could not be
discovered by the buyer’s initial inspection of the car”;136 and
5) Finding that the disclaimer is unconscionable.137
If the parol evidence provision in § 2-316(1) is not eliminated,
these same limitations can be used to allow into evidence the making
that an “oral express warranty is nothing more than an ‘additional consistent term’ for
which the writing leaves room”).
134 See, e.g., Ohio Sav. Bank v. H.L. Vokes Co., 560 N.E.2d 1328, 1334 (Ohio Ct. App.
1989) (“The purchase order was incomplete since it did not contain the engineers' actual
specifications. Therefore, evidence regarding the engineers' specifications and how they
were compiled, which would constitute additional terms of the contract, should have been
admitted to explain or supplement the contract between the parties.”); Mobile Hous.,
Inc. v. Stone, 490 S.W.2d 611, 615 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (“[P]arol testimony [of the express
warranty] was properly admitted to remove the said ambiguities with respect to the
description of the subject matter of the contract.”).
135 See also, e.g., Pinken v. Frank, 704 F.2d 1019, 1023–24 (8th Cir. 1983) (“It would be
indeed ironic if this court were to blindly apply a fraud preventing doctrine¾the parol evidence
rule. . . . We simply cannot accept the proposition that the parol evidence rule was designed to
foreclose a showing of fraud by preventing the admission of oral misrepresentations
contradicting the terms of a written contract.”); City Dodge, Inc. v. Gardner, 208 S.E.2d 794,
798 (Ga. 1974) (“In this case, parol evidence of the alleged misrepresentation was admissible
on the question of fraud and deceit. As the antecedent fraud was proven to the
satisfaction of the jury, it vitiated the contract. We hold, therefore, that the Uniform
Commercial Code does not preclude an action in tort based upon fraudulent
misrepresentation . . . .” (citation omitted)); George Robberecht Seafood, Inc. v. Maitland
Bros. Co., 255 S.E.2d 682, 683 (Va. 1979) (“A buyer can show that a contract of sale was
induced by the seller's fraud, notwithstanding . . . the written contract contains covenants
waiving warranties or disclaiming or limiting liabilities. ‘The express warranty, which
purports to be “in lieu of all other warranties” does not render the seller immune from
fraud that induced [a] contract. The warranty stands no higher than the contract which is
vitiated by the fraud.’” (quoting Packard Norfolk v. Miller, 198 Va. 557, 565 (1956))).
136 Leveridge v. Notaras, 433 P.2d 935, 941 (Okla. 1967); see also, e.g., CLARK & SMITH,
supra note 90, § 4:29 (“§ 2-202(a) provides that a writing may be ‘explained’ or
‘supplemented’ by course of dealing or usage of trade under § 1-205 or by course of
performance under § 2-208.”).
137 See, e.g., Seibel v. Layne & Bowler, Inc., 641 P.2d 668, 671 (Or. Ct. App. 1982)
(“[U]nder the UCC, courts are to limit the application of contract provisions so as to avoid
any unconscionable result . . . it would be unconscionable to permit an inconspicuous
merger clause to exclude evidence of an express oral warranty . . . .”); CLARK & SMITH,
supra note 90, § 4:31 (2017) (noting that courts will invalidate a disclaimer or merger
clause on unconscionability grounds in order to admit oral express warranties).
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of an express “fitness” warranty, even in the presence of a merger
clause, and even in the face of a parol evidence rule argument. That
way, the “words of negation . . . being inoperative” doctrine would
allow the warranty to be enforceable. Once again, it does not
make sense for the buyer in cases like Situation II to be denied
warranty protection through application of the parol evidence
rule, as occurred in Silver, when there are so many arguments to
defeat application of the rule in cases like Situation I.
V. CONCLUSION
When buyers express a purpose for which they want a good,
and the seller undertakes to supply them with a good that will
meet their needs, the seller has made an express promise that
the good will suffice when the sale is consummated. Under
normative bargaining expectations, that promise is as express as
if the seller had actually said, for example, “the watch is
watertight down to 200 feet.” As such, the law should treat these
situations as express warranty claims, and eliminate as
unnecessary the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose. Not only does such an analysis make more analytical
sense, it also solves some persistent problems that have plagued
those seeking to allege and judge an implied fitness warranty case.
VI. APPENDIX
If any state, or the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, is persuaded that U.C.C. § 2-315 should be
eliminated and fitness cases should be analyzed as express
warranty cases under U.C.C. § 2-313, what follows is suggested
language to effect that change, presented in redlined form.
Suggested Amendments to Article 2:
§ 2-313. Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise,
Description, Sample, and Action.
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to
the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods
shall conform to the affirmation or promise. Such affirmation of
fact can be made by the seller directly, via language conveying
such affirmation or promise, or by the seller indirectly, by
providing goods purportedly meeting the buyer’s needs after the
buyer has made it reasonably apparent that the buyer is looking
to the seller to supply goods with particular attributes.
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(b) Any description of the goods, whether by language of
description provided by the seller, or by the seller’s supplying
goods in response to a buyer’s request to the seller to provide
goods with a particular attribute, which is made part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the
goods shall conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty
that the seller use formal words such as “warrant” or “guarantee”
or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, or that
the seller be the one who initially articulates the affirmation,
promise or description, so long as the buyer has made it
reasonably apparent that he or she is looking to the seller to
supply goods which meet specified criteria and the seller
thereafter undertakes to provide goods sufficient to meet buyer’s
needs, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a
statement purporting to be merely the seller’s opinion or
commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
Official Comment
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: Sections 12, 14 and 16,
Uniform Sales Act.
Changes: Rewritten.
Purposes of Changes: To consolidate and systematize basic
principles with the result that:
1. “Express” warranties rest on “dickered” aspects of the
individual bargain, and go so clearly to the essence of that
bargain that words of disclaimer in a form are repugnant to the
basic dickered terms. “Implied” warranties The “implied”
warranty of fitness rests so clearly on a common factual situation
or set of conditions with a merchant seller that no particular
language or action is necessary to evidence them it, and they it
will arise in such a situation unless unmistakably negated.
This section reverts to the older case law insofar as the
warranties of description and sample are designated “express”
rather than “implied.” However, by virtue of the 2019
amendment, it also now establishes that what was previously a
warranty of fitness, where a buyer describes the desired
attribute(s) of the good and the seller furnishes a good that
purportedly meet such attribute(s), creates an express warranty
and should be analyzed under this section.
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2. Although this section is limited in its scope and direct
purpose to warranties made by the seller to the buyer, whether
directly or indirectly, as part of a contract for sale, the warranty
sections of this Article are not designed in any way to disturb
those lines of case law growth which have recognized that
warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to the
direct parties to such a contract. They may arise in other
appropriate circumstances such as in the case of bailments for
hire, whether such bailment is itself the main contract or is
merely a supplying of containers under a contract for the sale of
their contents. The provisions of Section 2-318 on third party
beneficiaries expressly recognize this case law development
within one particular area. Beyond that, the matter is left to the
case law with the intention that the policies of this Act may offer
useful guidance in dealing with further cases as they arise.
3. The present section deals with affirmations of fact by the
seller, descriptions of the goods or exhibitions of samples,
whether made directly to the buyer or by means of supplying
goods to the buyer after learning that the buyer expects the seller
to deliver goods with certain attributes, exactly as any other part
of a negotiation which ends in a contract is dealt with. No specific
intention to make a warranty is necessary if any of these factors
is made part of the basis of the bargain. In actual practice
affirmations of fact made by the seller, directly or indirectly,
about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the
description of those goods; hence no particular reliance on such
statements need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric
of the agreement. Rather, any fact which is to take such
affirmations, once made, out of the agreement requires clear
affirmative proof. The issue normally is one of fact.
4. In view of the principle that the whole purpose of the law
of warranty is to determine what it is that the seller has in
essence agreed to sell, the policy is adopted of those cases which
refuse except in unusual circumstances to recognize a material
deletion of the seller’s obligation. Thus, a contract is normally a
contract for a sale of something describable and described. A clause
generally disclaiming “all warranties, express or implied” cannot
reduce the seller’s obligation with respect to such description and
therefore cannot be given literal effect under Section 2-316.
This is not intended to mean that the parties, if they
consciously desire, cannot make their own bargain as they wish.
But in determining what they have agreed upon good faith is a
factor and consideration should be given to the fact that the
probability is small that a real price is intended to be exchanged
for a pseudo-obligation.
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5. Paragraph (1)(b) makes specific some of the principles set
forth above when a description of the goods is first given by the
seller or the buyer. A description need not be by words. Technical
specifications, blueprints and the like can afford more exact
description than mere language and if made part of the basis of
the bargain goods must conform with them. Past deliveries may
set the description of quality, either expressly or impliedly by
course of dealing. Of course, all descriptions by merchants must
be read against the applicable trade usages with the general
rules as to merchantability resolving any doubts.
6. The basic situation as to statements affecting the true
essence of the bargain is no different when a sample or model is
involved in the transaction. This section includes both a “sample”
actually drawn from the bulk of goods which is the subject matter
of the sale, and a “model” which is offered for inspection when the
subject matter is not at hand and which has not been drawn from
the bulk of the goods. Although the underlying principles are
unchanged, the facts are often ambiguous when something is
shown as illustrative, rather than as a straight sample. In
general, the presumption is that any sample or model just as any
affirmation of fact is intended to become a basis of the bargain.
But there is no escape from the question of fact. When the seller
exhibits a sample purporting to be drawn from an existing bulk,
good faith of course requires that the sample be fairly drawn. But
in mercantile experience the mere exhibition of a “sample” does
not of itself show whether it is merely intended to “suggest” or to
“be” the character of the subject-matter of the contract. The
question is whether the seller has so acted with reference to the
sample as to make him responsible that the whole shall have at
least the values shown by it. The circumstances aid in answering
this question. If the sample has been drawn from an existing
bulk, it must be regarded as describing values of the goods
contracted for unless it is accompanied by an unmistakable
denial of such responsibility. If, on the other hand, a model of
merchandise not on hand is offered, the mercantile presumption
that it has become a literal description of the subject matter is
not so strong, and particularly so if modification on the buyer’s
initiative impairs any feature of the model.
7. The precise time when words of description or affirmation
are made or samples are shown is not material nor is whether
the words of description or affirmation or samples come first from
the buyer or the seller. The sole question is whether the language
or samples or models are fairly to be regarded as part of the
contract. If language is used after the closing of the deal (as when
the buyer when taking delivery asks and receives an additional
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assurance, the warranty becomes a modification, and need not be
supported by consideration if it is otherwise reasonable and in
order (Section 2-209).
8. Concerning affirmations of value or a seller’s opinion or
commendation under subsection (2), the basic question remains
the same: What statements or actions of the seller have in the
circumstances and in objective judgment become part of the basis
of the bargain? As indicated above, all of the statements of the
seller, and the actions of the seller in furnishing the good after
reasonable notice that the buyer is relying on the seller to
furnish goods with particular attributes, do so unless good reason
is shown to the contrary. The provisions of subsection (2) are
included, however, since common experience discloses that some
statements or predictions cannot fairly be viewed as entering into
the bargain. Even as to false statements of value, however, the
possibility is left open that a remedy may be provided by the law
relating to fraud or misrepresentation.
==================================================
§ 2-316. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties.
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit
warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent
with each other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on
parol or extrinsic evidence ( Section 2-202) words of negation or
limitation is are inoperative to the extent that such construction
is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied
warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must
mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be
conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of
fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous.
Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient
if it states, for example, that “There are no warranties which
extend beyond the description on the face hereof.” can be
disclaimed or modified by: (i) use of the word “merchantability”
and in case of a writing must be conspicuous; or (ii) use of
expressions like “as is,” “with all faults” or other language which
in common understanding calls the buyer’s attention to the
exclusion of the warranty and makes plain that there is no
implied warranty unless the circumstances indicate otherwise; or
(iii) by course of dealing, course of performance or usage of trade.
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied
warranties are excluded by expressions like “as is”, “with all
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faults” or other language which in common understanding calls
the buyer’s attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes
plain that there is no implied warranty; and
(b)(a) wWhen the buyer before entering into the contract has
examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired
or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty
of merchantability with regard to defects which an examination
ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him.; and
(c) (b) Aan implied warranty can also be excluded or modified
by course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in
accordance with the provisions of this Article on liquidation or
limitation of damages and on contractual modification of remedy
(Sections 2-718 and 2-719).
Official Comment
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: None. See sections 15
and 71, Uniform Sales Act.
Purposes:
1. This section is designed principally to deal with those
frequent clauses in sales contracts which seek to exclude “all
warranties, express or implied.” It seeks to protect a buyer from
unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by denying
effect to such language when inconsistent with language of
express warranty and permitting the exclusion of the implied
warrantiesy of merchantability only by conspicuous language or
other circumstances which protect the buyer from surprise.
2. The seller is protected under this Article Protections for
the seller against false allegations of oral warranties may be
provided, when appropriate, by its this Article’s provisions on
parol and extrinsic evidence and against unauthorized
representations by the customary “lack of authority” clauses.
This Article treats the limitation or avoidance of consequential
damages as a matter of limiting remedies for breach, separate
from the matter of creation of liability under a warranty. If no
warranty exists, there is of course no problem of limiting
remedies for breach of warranty. Under subsection (4) the
question of limitation of remedy is governed by the sections
referred to rather than by this section.
3. Disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability is
permitted under subsection (2), but with the safeguard that such
disclaimers must mention merchantability and in case of a
writing must be conspicuous.
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4. Unlike the implied warranty of merchantability, implied
warranties of fitness for a particular purpose may be excluded by
general language, but only if it is in writing and conspicuous.
5 4. Subsection (2) presupposes that the implied warranty in
question of merchantability exists unless excluded or modified.
Whether or not language of disclaimer satisfies the requirements
of this section, such language may be relevant under other
sections to the question whether the warranty was ever in fact
created. Thus, unless the provisions of this Article on parol and
extrinsic evidence prevent, oral language of disclaimer may raise
issues of fact as to whether reliance by the buyer occurred and
whether the seller had “reason to know” under the section on
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
6 5. The exceptions to the general rule set forth in
paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of subsection (3) (2) are common
factual situations in which the circumstances surrounding the
transaction are in themselves sufficient to call the buyer’s
attention to the fact that no implied warrantiesy of
merchantability are is made or that a certain implied warranty it
is being excluded.
7 6. Paragraph (a) of subsection (3) (ii) of subsection (2) deals
with general terms such as “as is,” “as they stand,” “with all
faults,” and the like. Such terms in ordinary commercial usage
are understood to mean that the buyer takes the entire risk as to
the quality of the goods involved. The terms covered by
paragraph (a) are in fact merely a particularization of paragraph
(c) which provides for exclusion or modification of implied
warranties by usage of trade.
8 7. Under paragraph (b) of subsection (3), the implied
warrantiesy of merchantability may be excluded or modified by
the circumstances where the buyer examines the goods or a
sample or model of them before entering into the contract.
“Examination” as used in this paragraph is not synonymous with
inspection before acceptance or at any other time after the
contract has been made. It goes rather to the nature of the
responsibility assumed by the seller at the time of the making of
the contract. Of course if the buyer discovers the defect and uses the
goods anyway, or if he or she unreasonably fails to examine the goods
before he or she uses them, resulting injuries may be found to result
from his or her own action rather than proximately from a breach of
warranty. See Sections 2-314 and 2-715 and comments thereto.
In order to bring the transaction within the scope of “refused
to examine” in paragraph (b) subsection (3), it is not sufficient
that the goods are available for inspection. There must in
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addition be a demand by the seller that the buyer examine the
goods fully. The seller by the demand puts the buyer on notice
that he is assuming the risk of defects which the examination
ought to reveal. The language “refused to examine” in this
paragraph is intended to make clear the necessity for such
demand. Application of the doctrine of “caveat emptor” in all
cases where the buyer examines the goods regardless of
statements made by the seller is, however, rejected by this
Article. Thus, if the offer of examination is accompanied by words
as to their merchantability or specific attributes and the buyer
indicates clearly that he is relying on those words rather than on
his examination, they give rise to an “express” warranty. In such
cases the question is one of fact as to whether a warranty of
merchantability has been expressly incorporated in the
agreement. Disclaimer of such an express warranty is governed
by subsection (1) of the present section. The particular buyer’s
skill and the normal method of examining goods in the
circumstances determine what defects are excluded by the
examination. A failure to notice defects which are obvious cannot
excuse the buyer. However, an examination under circumstances
which do not permit chemical or other testing of the goods would
not exclude defects which could be ascertained only by such
testing. Nor can latent defects be excluded by a simple
examination. A professional buyer examining a product in his
field will be held to have assumed the risk as to all defects which
a professional in the field ought to observe, while a
nonprofessional buyer will be held to have assumed the risk only
for such defects as a layman might be expected to observe.
9 8. The situation in which the buyer gives precise and
complete specifications to the seller is not explicitly covered in
this section, but this is a frequent circumstance by which the
implied warrantiesy may be excluded does not attach. The
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose An express warranty
would not normally arise since in such a situation there is
usually no reliance on the seller by the buyer the specifications
are not usually part of the basis of the bargain between the two,
since there is usually no reliance on the seller by the buyer. The
warranty of merchantability in such a transaction, however,
must be considered in connection with the next section on the
cumulation and conflict of warranties. Under paragraph (c) of
that section in case of such an inconsistency the implied
warranty of merchantability is displaced by the express warranty
that the goods will comply with the specifications. Thus, where
the buyer gives detailed specifications as to the goods, neither of
the implied warranties as to quality will normally apply to the
transaction unless consistent with the specifications.
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==================================================
§ 2-317. Cumulation and Conflict of Warranties
Express or Implied.
Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed as
consistent with each other and as cumulative, but if such
construction is unreasonable the intention of the parties shall
determine which warranty is dominant. In ascertaining that
intention the following rules apply:
(a) Exact or technical specifications displace an inconsistent
sample or model or general language of description.
(b) A sample from an existing bulk displaces inconsistent
general language of description.
(c) Express warranties displace an inconsistent implied
warranty other than an implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose warranty of merchantability.
Official Comment
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: On cumulation of
warranties see Sections 14, 15, and 16, Uniform Sales Act.
Changes: Completely rewritten into one section.
Purposes of Changes:
1. The present section rests on the basic policy of this Article
that no warranty is created except by some conduct (either
affirmative action or failure to disclose) on the part of the seller.
Therefore, all warranties are made cumulative unless this
construction of the contract is impossible or unreasonable.
This Article thus follows the general policy of the Uniform
Sales Act except that in case of the sale of an article by its
patent or trade name the elimination of the an express
warranty of fitness depends solely on whether the buyer has
relied on the seller’s asked the seller to use his or her skill and
judgment in providing a product that meets any expressed
needs of the buyer, or whether the seller has undertaken only to
provide the good whose patent or trade name was provided by
the buyer. ; the use of the patent or trade name is but one factor
in making this determination.
2. The rules of this section are designed to aid in determining
the intention of the parties as to which of inconsistent warranties
which have arisen from the circumstances of their transaction
shall prevail. These rules of intention are to be applied only
where factors making for an equitable estoppel of the seller do
not exist and where he has in perfect good faith made warranties
which later turn out to be inconsistent. To the extent that the
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seller has led the buyer to believe that all of the warranties can
be performed, he is estopped from setting up any essential
inconsistency as a defense.
3. The rules in subsections (a), (b) and (c) are designed to
ascertain the intention of the parties by reference to the factor
which probably claimed the attention of the parties in the first
instance. These rules are not absolute but may be changed by
evidence showing that the conditions which existed at the time of
contracting make the construction called for by the section
inconsistent or unreasonable.

